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ABSTRACT
Recently, the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision proposed to replace all
approaches, including the advanced measurement approach (AMA), to operational
risk capital with a simple formula referred to as the standardized measurement
approach (SMA). This paper discusses and studies the weaknesses and pitfalls of
the SMA, such as instability, risk insensitivity, super-additivity and the implicit rela-
tionship between the SMA capital model and systemic risk in the banking sector. We
also discuss issues with the closely related operational risk capital-at-risk (OpCar)
Basel Committee-proposed model, which is the precursor to the SMA. In conclu-
sion, we advocate to maintain the AMA internal model framework and suggest as an
alternative a number of standardization recommendations that could be considered
to unify the internal modeling of operational risk. The findings and views presented
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in this paper have been discussed with and supported by many OpRisk practitioners
and academics in Australia, Europe, the United Kingdom and the United States, and
recently at the OpRisk Europe 2016 conference in London.
Keywords: operational risk (OpRisk); standardized measurement approach (SMA); loss distri-
bution approach (LDA); advanced measurement approach (AMA); Basel Committee for Banking
Supervision (BCBS) regulations.
1 INTRODUCTION
Operational risk (OpRisk) management is the youngest of the three major risk
branches, with the others being market and credit risks within financial institutions.
The term OpRisk became more popular after the bankruptcy of Barings bank in 1995,
when a rogue trader caused the collapse of a venerable institution by placing bets in
the Asian markets and keeping these contracts out of sight of management. At the
time, these losses could be classified neither as market nor as credit risks, and the
term OpRisk started to be used in the industry to define situations where such losses
could arise. It was quite some time before this definition was abandoned and a proper
definition was established for OpRisk. In these early days, OpRisk had a negative
definition, “any risk that is not market or credit risk”, which was not very helpful to
assess and manage OpRisk. Looking back at the history of risk management research,
we observe that early academics found the same issue of classifying risk in general,
as Crockford (1982) noted:
Research into risk management immediately encounters some basic problems of def-
inition. There is still no general agreement on where the boundaries of the subject lie,
and a satisfactory definition of risk management is notoriously difficult to formulate.
One thing is for certain: as risk management started to grow as a discipline, regula-
tion also began to get more complex in order to catch up with new tools and techniques.
It is not a stretch to say that financial institutions have always been regulated one way
or another, given the risk they bring to the financial system. Regulation was mostly on
a country-by-country basis and very uneven, which allowed for arbitrages. As finan-
cial institutions became more globalized, the need for more symmetric regulation
that could level the way institutions would be supervised and regulated mechanically
increased worldwide.
As a consequence of such regulations, in some areas of risk management, such as
market risk and credit risk, there has been a gradual convergence or standardization
of best practice, which has been widely adopted by banks and financial institutions.
In the area of OpRisk modeling and management, such convergence of best practice
is still occurring. This is due to multiple factors, such as many different types of risk
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processes being modeled within the OpRisk framework, different influences and loss
experiences in the OpRisk categories in different banking jurisdictions and the very
nature of OpRisk being a relatively immature risk category compared with market
and credit risk.
The following question therefore arises: how can one begin to induce a standardiza-
tion of OpRisk modeling and capital calculation under Pillar I of the current banking
regulation accords from the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision (BCBS)? It
is stated under these accords that the basic objective of the Basel Committee’s work
has been to close gaps in international supervisory coverage in pursuit of two basic
principles: that no foreign banking establishment should escape supervision, and that
supervision should be adequate. It is this second note that forms the context for the
new proposed revisions to simplify OpRisk modeling approaches. These have been
brought out as two consultative documents:
 the standardized measurement approach (SMA), which was proposed in the
Basel Committee consultative document “Standardized measurement approach
for operational risk”, issued in March 2016 for comments by June 3, 2016 (Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision 2016); and
 the closely related OpRisk capital-at-risk (OpCar) model, which was proposed
in the Basel Committee consultative document “Operational risk: revisions to
the simpler approaches”, issued in October 2014 (Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision 2014).
In Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2014, p. 1), it is noted that “despite an
increase in the number and severity of operational risk events during and after the
financial crisis, capital requirements for operational risk have remained stable or even
fallen for the standardised approaches”. Consequently, it is reasonable to reconsider
these measures of capital adequacy and to decide if they need further revision. This
is exactly the process undertaken by the Basel Committee in preparing the revised
proposed frameworks that are discussed in this paper. Before getting to the revised
framework of the SMA capital calculation, it is useful to recall the current best practice
in Basel regulations.
Many models have been suggested for modeling OpRisk under the Basel II regu-
latory framework (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2006). Fundamentally,
two different approaches are considered: the top-down approach and the bottom-up
approach. A top-down approach quantifies OpRisk without attempting to identify the
events or causes of losses explicitly. It can include the risk indicator models, which
rely on a number of OpRisk exposure indicators to track OpRisks, and the scenario
analysis and stress-testing models, which are estimated based on what-if scenarios.
A bottom-up approach quantifies OpRisk on a micro-level, being based on identified
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internal events. It can include actuarial-type models (referred to as the loss distribution
approach (LDA)) that model the frequency and severity of OpRisk losses.
Under the current regulatory framework for OpRisk (Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision 2006), banks can use several methods to calculate OpRisk capital: the
basic indicator approach (BIA), the standardized approach (TSA) and the advanced
measurement approach (AMA). Detailed discussion of these approaches can be found
in Cruz et al (2015, Chapter 1). In brief, under the BIA and TSA, the capital is
calculated as simple functions of gross income (GI):
KBIA D ˛ 1
n
3X
jD1
maxfGI.j /; 0g; n D
3X
jD1
1fGI.j />0g; ˛ D 0:15; (1.1)
KTSA D 1
3
3X
jD1
max
 8X
iD1
ˇi GIi .j /; 0

; (1.2)
where 1fg is the standard indicator symbol, which equals 1 if the condition in fg
is true, and 0 otherwise. Here, GI.j / is the annual gross income of a bank in year
j ; GIi .j / is the gross income of business line i in year j ; and ˇi are coefficients
in the range [0.12–0.18], specified by the Basel Committee for eight business lines.
These approaches have a very coarse level of model granularity and are generally
considered simplistic top-down approaches. Some country-specific regulators have
adopted slightly modified versions of the BIA and TSA.
Under the AMA, banks are allowed to use their own models to estimate the capital.
A bank intending to use AMA should demonstrate the accuracy of the internal models
within Basel II-specified risk cells (eight business lines by seven event types) relevant
to the bank. This is a finer level of granularity, more appropriate for a detailed analysis
of risk processes in the financial institution. Typically, at this level of granularity, the
models are based on bottom-up approaches. The most widely used AMA is the LDA
based on modeling the annual frequency N and severities X1; X2; : : : of OpRisk
losses for a risk cell, so that the annual loss for a bank over the d risk cells is
Z D
dX
jD1
NjX
iD1
X
.j /
i : (1.3)
Then, the regulatory capital is calculated as the 0.999 value-at-risk (VaR), which is
the quantile of the distribution for the next year’s annual loss Z:
KLDA D VaRqŒZ WD inffz 2 R W PrŒZ > z 6 1  qg; q D 0:999I (1.4)
this can be reduced by expected loss covered through internal provisions. Typically,
frequency and severities within a risk cell are assumed to be independent.
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For around ten years, the space of OpRisk has been evolving under this model-
based structure. A summary of the the Basel accords over this period of time (Basel
II–Basel III) can be captured as follows:
 they ensure that capital allocation is more risk sensitive;
 they enhance disclosure requirements that allow market participants to assess
the capital adequacy of an institution;
 they ensure that credit risk, OpRisk and market risk are quantified based on
data and formal techniques;
 they attempt to align economic and regulatory capital more closely to reduce
the scope for regulatory arbitrage.
While the final Basel accord has at large addressed the regulatory arbitrage issue, there
are still areas where regulatory capital requirements will diverge from the economic
capital.
However, it was observed recently in studies performed by the BCBS and several
local banking regulators that the BIA and TSA do not correctly estimate the OpRisk
capital, ie, GI as a proxy indicator for OpRisk exposure appeared to be not a good
assumption.Also, it appeared that capital under theAMA is difficult to compare across
banks, due to the wide range of practices adopted by different banks.
So, at this point, two options are available to further refine and standardize OpRisk
modeling practices: (1) to refine the BIA and TSA and, more importantly, converge
within internal modeling in the AMA framework, or (2) to remove all internal mod-
eling and modeling practice in OpRisk in favor of an overly simplified “one size fits
all” SMA model (sadly, this is the option that has been adopted by the current round
of Basel Committee consultations (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2016)
in Pillar 1).
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 formally defines the Basel-proposed
SMA. The subsequent sections involve a collection of summary results and comments
for studies performed on the proposed SMA model. Capital instability and sensitiv-
ity are studied in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the reduction of risk responsivity
and incentivized risk-taking. Discarding key sources of OpRisk data is discussed in
Section 5. The possibility of super-additive capital under SMA is examined in Sec-
tion 6. Section 7 summarizes the Basel Committee procedure for the estimation of
OpCar model and underlying assumptions and discusses the issues with this approach.
The paper then concludes with suggestions in Section 8 relating to maintaining the
AMA internal model framework with standardization recommendations that could be
considered in order to unify the internal modeling of OpRisk.
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2 BASEL COMMITTEE-PROPOSED STANDARDIZED
MEASUREMENT APPROACH
This section introduces the new simplifications that are being proposed by the Basel
Committee for models in OpRisk, starting with a brief overview of how this process
was initiated by the OpRisk capital-at-risk (OpCar) model proposed in Basel Commit-
tee on Banking Supervision (2014), and then finishing with the current version of this
approach, known as the SMA, proposed in Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
(2016).
We begin with a clarification comment on the first round of the proposal, which is
important conceptually to clarify for practitioners. In Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision (2014, p. 1), it is stated that:
Despite an increase in the number and severity of operational risk events during and
after the financial crisis, capital requirements for operational risk have remained stable
or even fallen for the standardized approaches. This indicates that the existing set of
simple approaches for operational risk – the BIA and TSA, including its variant the
alternative standardized approach (ASA) – do not correctly estimate the operational
risk capital requirements of a wide spectrum of banks.
We agree that, in general, there are many cases in which banks will be under-
capitalized for large crisis events, such as that which hit in 2008. Therefore, with
the benefit of hindsight, it is prudent to reconsider these simplified models and
look for improvements and reformulations that can be achieved in the wake of new
information after the 2008 crisis. In fact, we would argue this is sensible practice
in model assessment and model criticism, after new information regarding model
suitability.
As we observed, the BIA and TSA make very simplistic assumptions regarding
capital. Namely, that the GI can be used as an adequate proxy indicator for OpRisk
exposure and, further, that a bank’s OpRisk exposure increases linearly in proportion
to revenue. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2014, p. 1) also makes two
relevant points that “the existing approaches do not take into account the fact that
the relationship between the size and the operational risk of a bank does not remain
constant or that operational risk exposure increases with a bank’s size in a nonlinear
fashion”.
Further, neither the BIA nor TSA approaches have been recalibrated since 2004.
We believe that this is a huge mistake, that models and calibrations should be
tested regularly and that each piece of regulation should come with its revi-
sion plan. As can be seen from experience, the model assumption has typically
turned out to be invalid in a dynamically changing non-stationary risk management
environment.
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The two main objectives of the OpCar model proposed in Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision (2014) were stated to be the following:
(i) to refine the OpRisk proxy indicator by replacing GI with a superior indicator;
(ii) to improve calibration of the regulatory coefficients based on the results of the
quantitative analysis.
To achieve this, the Basel Committee argued – on practical grounds – that the model
developed should be sufficiently simple to be applied with “comparability of outcomes
in the framework”, and that it should be “simple enough to understand, not unduly
burdensome to implement, should not have too many parameters for calculation by
banks and it should not rely on banks’ internal models”. However, they also claimed
that such a new approach should “exhibit enhanced risk sensitivity” relative to the
GI-based frameworks.
Additionally, such a one-size-fits-all framework “should be calibrated according
to the OpRisk profile of a large number of banks of different size and business mod-
els.” We disagree with this motivation, as many banks in different jurisdictions and
for different bank size and different bank practice may indeed come from different
population level distributions. In other words, the OpCar approach assumes all banks
have a common population distribution from which their loss experience is drawn,
and that this will be universal, no matter what your business practice, business vol-
ume or jurisdiction of operation. Such an assumption may lead to a less risk-sensitive
framework, with poorer insight into actual risk processes in a given bank than a prop-
erly designed model developed for a particular business volume, operating region and
business practice.
The background and some further studies on the precursor OpCar framework, which
was originally supposed to replace just the BIA and TSA methods, are provided in
Section 7.We explain how the OpCar simplified framework was developed, discuss the
fact that it is based on an LDA model and a regression structure, and demonstrate how
this model was estimated and developed. Along the way, we provide some scientific
criticism of several technical aspects of the estimation and approximations utilized. It
is important to still consider such aspects, as this model is the precursor to the SMA
formula. That is, a single LDA is assumed for a bank, and single-loss approximation
(SLA) is used to estimate the 0.999 quantile of the annual loss. Four different severity
distributions were fitted to the data from many banks, and Poisson distribution is
assumed for the frequency. Then, a nonlinear regression is used to regress the obtained
bank capital (across many banks) to different combinations of explanatory variables
from bank books, to end up with the OpCar formula.
The currently proposed SMA for OpRisk capital in Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision (2016) is the main subject of our paper. However, we note that it is based
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on the OpCar formulation, which itself is nothing more than an LDA model applied
in an overly simplified fashion at the institution top level.
In Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2016), it was proposed that all
existing BIAs, TSAs andAMAs would be replaced with the SMA, calculating OpRisk
capital as a function of the so-called business indicator (BI) and loss component (LC).
Specifically, denote Xi .t/ as the i th loss and N.t/ as the number of losses in year t .
Then, the SMA capital KSMA is defined as
KSMA.BI; LC/
D
8ˆ<
:ˆ
BIC if Bucket 1;
110 C .BIC  110/ ln

exp.1/  1 C LC
BIC

if Buckets 2–5:
(2.1)
Here,
LC D 7 1
T
TX
tD1
N.t/X
iD1
Xi .t/ C 7 1
T
TX
tD1
N.t/X
iD1
Xi .t/1fXi>10g
C 5 1
T
TX
tD1
N.t/X
iD1
Xi .t/1fXi .t/>100g; (2.2)
where T D 10 years (or at least five years for banks that do not have ten years of
good quality loss data in the transition period). Buckets and the business indicator
component (BIC) are calculated as
BIC D
8ˆˆˆ
ˆˆˆˆˆˆ
<
ˆˆˆˆˆˆ
ˆˆˆ:
0:11  BI if BI 6 1000; Bucket 1;
110 C 0:15  .BI  1000/ if 1000 < BI 6 3000; Bucket 2;
410 C 0:19  .BI  3000/ if 3000 < BI 6 10 000; Bucket 3;
1740 C 0:23  .BI  10000/ if 10 000 < BI 6 30 000; Bucket 4;
6340 C 0:29  .BI  30000/ if BI > 30 000; Bucket 5:
(2.3)
BI is defined as a sum of three components: the interest, lease and dividend com-
ponent; the services component; and the financial component. It is made up of almost
the same profit and loss (P&L) items used for the calculation of GI but combined in
a different way (for precise formula, see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
(2016)). All amounts in the above formulas are in € millions.
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3 STANDARDIZED MEASUREMENT APPROACH INTRODUCES
CAPITAL INSTABILITY
In our analysis, we observed that SMA fails to achieve the objective of capital stability.
In this section, we consider several examples to illustrate this feature. In most cases,
we show results for only lognormal severity; other distribution types considered in
the OpCar model lead to similar or even more pronounced features.
3.1 Capital instability examples
Consider a simple representative model for a bank’s annual OpRisk loss process,
comprised of the aggregation of two generic loss processes: one high frequency with
low severity loss amounts, and the other corresponding to low frequency and high
severity loss amounts, given by Poisson–Gamma and Poisson–lognormal models,
respectively. We set the BI constant to €2 billion at half way within the interval for
Bucket 2 of the SMA. We kept the model parameters static over time and simulated
a history of 1000 years of loss data for three differently sized banks (small, medium
and large), using different parameter settings for the loss models to characterize such
banks. For a simple analysis, we set a small bank corresponding to capital in the order
of tens of millions of euros in average annual loss, a medium bank in the order of
hundreds of millions of euros in average annual loss, and a large bank in the order
of €1 billion in average annual loss. We then studied the variability that may arise in
the capital under the SMA formulation, under the optimal scenario that models did
not change, model parameters were not recalibrated and the business environment
did not change significantly, in the sense that BI was kept constant. In this case, we
observe the core variation that arises just from the loss history experience of banks
of the three different sizes over time.
Our analysis shows that a given institution can experience the situation in which
its capital more than doubles from one year to the next, without any changes to the
parameters, the model or the BI structure (Figure 1). This also means that two banks
with the same risk profile can produce SMA capital numbers differing by a factor of
more than two.
In summary, the simulation takes the case of a BI fixed over time, and the loss model
for the institution is fixed according to two independent loss processes given by
Poisson./– Gamma.˛; ˇ/ and Poisson./– lognormal.; /. Here, Gamma.˛; ˇ/
is the Gamma distribution of the loss severities, with mean ˛ˇ and variance ˛ˇ2;
lognormal.; / is the lognormal distribution of severities with the mean of the log-
severity equal to  and the variance of the log-severity equal to 2.
The institution’s total losses are set to be on average around 1000 per year, with
1% coming from the heavy-tailed loss process Poisson–lognormal component. We
perform two case studies, one in which the shape parameter of the heavy-tailed loss
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TABLE 1 Test case 1 versus test case 2.
Test case 1 Test case 2‚ …„ ƒ ‚ …„ ƒ
Mean annual Annual loss Mean annual Annual loss
Bank loss 99.9% VaR loss 99.9% VaR
size (€ million) (€ million) (€ million) (€ million)
Small 15 260 21 772
Medium 136 1841 181 5457
Large 769 14 610 1101 41 975
Test case 1 corresponds to the risk process Poisson.10/–lognormal. D f10I 12I 14g;  D 2.5/ and Poisson.990/–
Gamma.˛ D 1; ˇ D f104I 105I 5105g/.Test case 2 corresponds to Poisson.10/–lognormal. D f10I 12I 14g;  D
2.8/ and Poisson.990/–Gamma.˛ D 1; ˇ D f104I 105I 5  105g/.
process component is  D 2:5 and the other in which it is  D 2:8. We summarize
the settings for the two cases below in Table 1. The ideal situation that would indicate
the SMA was not producing capital figures that were too volatile would be if each of
parts (a) to (f) in Figure 1 were very closely constrained around 1. However, as we
can see, the variability in capital from year to year in all size institutions can be very
significant. Note that we used different sequences of independent random numbers to
generate results for small, medium and large banks in a test case. Thus, caution should
be exercised in interpreting the results of test case 1 (or test case 2) for the relative
comparison of capital variability in different banks. At the same time, comparing test
case 1 with test case 2, one can certainly observe that an increase in  increases the
capital variability.
3.2 Capital instability and BI when SMA matches AMA
As a second study of the SMA capital instability, we consider a loss process model
Poisson./– lognormal.; /. Instead of fixing the BI to the midpoint of Bucket 2 of
the SMA formulation, we numerically solve for the BI that would produce the SMA
capital equal to the VaR for a Poisson–lognormal LDA model at the annual 99.9%
quantile level, VaR0:999.
In other words, we find the BI such that the LDA capital matches the SMA cap-
ital in the long term. This is achieved by solving the following nonlinear equation
numerically via root search for the BI:
KSMA.BI; fLC/ D VaR0:999; (3.1)
where fLC is the long-term average of the loss component (2.2) that can be calculated
in the case of Poisson./ frequency as
fLC D   .7EŒX C 7EŒX j X > L C 5EŒX j X > H/: (3.2)
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FIGURE 1 Ratio of the SMA capital to the long-term average.
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Test case 1 corresponds to  D 2.5 (parts (a), (c) and (e)); Test case 2 corresponds to  D 2.8 (parts (b), (d) and
(f)). Other parameters are as specified in Table 1. Results for small (parts (a) and (b)), intermediate (parts (c) and
(d)) and large (parts (e) and (f)) banks are based on different realizations of random variables in simulation.
In the case of severity X from lognormal.; /, it can be found in closed form as
fLC.; ; / D eC 12 27 C 7˚2 C   ln L


C 5˚

2 C   ln H


;
(3.3)
where ˚./ denotes the standard normal distribution function, L is €10 million and
H is €100 million, as specified by the SMA formula (2.2).
One can approximate the VaR0:999 under the Poisson–lognormal model according
to the so-called SLA (discussed in Section 7), given for ˛ " 1 by
VaR˛  SLA.˛I;; /
D exp

 C ˚1

1  1  ˛


C  exp. C 1
2
2/; (3.4)
where ˚1./ is the inverse of the standard normal distribution function. In this
case, the results for the implied BI values are presented in Table 2 for  D 10 and
varied lognormal  and  parameters. Note that it is also not difficult to calculate
VaR˛ “exactly” (within numerical error) using Monte Carlo, Panjer recursion or fast
Fourier transform (FFT) numerical methods.
www.risk.net/journal Journal of Operational Risk
12 G. W. Peters et al
TABLE 2 Implied BI in billions,  D 10.
‚ …„ ƒ
 1.5 1.75 2.0 2.25 2.5 2.75 3.0
10 0.06 0.14 0.36 0.89 2.41 5.73 13.24
12 0.44 1.05 2.61 6.12 14.24 32.81 72.21
14 2.52 5.75 13.96 33.50 76.63 189.22 479.80
FIGURE 2 Ratio of the SMA capital to the long-term average.
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For a study of capital instability, we use the BI obtained from matching the long-
term average SMA capital with the long-term LDA capital, as described above for an
example generated by Poisson.10/– lognormal. D 12;  D 2:5/. We correspond-
ingly found implied BI D €14:714 billion (Bucket 4). In this case, we calculate
VaR0:999 using Monte Carlo instead of an SLA (3.4); thus, the value of implied BI
is slightly different from that in Table 2. In this case, the SMA capital based on the
long-term average LC is€1.87 billion, which is about the same as VaR0:999 D €1:87
billion. The year-on-year variability in the capital with this combination of implied
BI and Poisson–lognormal loss model is given in Figure 2. This shows that, again,
we get capital instability with capital doubling from year to year compared with the
long-term average SMA capital.
3.3 SMA is excessively sensitive to the dominant loss process
Consider an institution with a wide range of different types of OpRisk loss processes
present in each of its business units and risk types. As in our first study above, we
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FIGURE 3 Boxplot results for the ratio of the SMA capital to the long-term average for
different values of the lognormal shape parameter  , based on simulations over 1000
years.
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split these loss processes into two categories: high-frequency/low-severity types and
low-frequency/high-severity types, given by Poisson.990/– Gamma.1; 5  105/ and
Poisson.10/– lognormal.14; /, respectively. In this study, we consider the sensitivity
of SMA capital to the dominant loss process. More precisely, we study the sensitivity
of SMA capital to the parameter  , which dictates how heavy the tail of the most
extreme loss process will be. Figure 3 shows boxplot results based on simulations
performed over 1000 years for different values of  D f2I 2:25I 2:5I 2:75I 3g.
These results can be interpreted to mean that banks with more extreme loss expe-
riences as indicated by heavier-tailed dominant loss processes (increasing  ) tend to
have significantly greater capital instability compared with banks with less extreme
loss experiences. Importantly, these findings demonstrate how nonlinear this increase
in SMA capital can be as the heaviness of the dominant loss process tail increases.
For instance, banks with relatively low heavy-tailed dominant loss processes ( D 2)
tend to have a capital variability year on year of between 1.1 to 1.4 multipliers of
long-term average SMA capital. However, banks with relatively large heavy-tailed
dominant loss processes ( D 2:5, 2.75 or 3) tend to have excessively unstable year-
on-year capital figures, with variation in capital being as bad as three to four times
multipliers of the long-term average SMA capital. Further, it is clear that when one
considers each box plot as representing a population of banks with similar dominant
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loss process characteristics, the population distribution of capital becomes increas-
ingly skewed and demonstrates increasing kurtosis in the right tail as the tail heaviness
of the dominant loss process in each population increases. This clearly demonstrates
excessive variability in capital year on year for banks with heavy-tailed dominant loss
processes.
Therefore, the SMA fails to achieve the claimed objective of robust capital esti-
mation. Capital produced by the proposed SMA approach will be neither stable nor
robust with worsening robustness as the severity of OpRisk increases. In other words,
banks with higher severity OpRisk exposures will be substantially worse off under
the SMA approach with regard to capital sensitivity.
4 REDUCED RISK RESPONSIVITY AND INDUCED RISK-TAKING
It is obvious that the SMA capital is less responsive to risk drivers and the variation
in loss experience that is observed in a bank at granularity of the Basel II fifty-six
business line/event type (BL/ET) units of measure.
This is due to the naive approach of modeling at the level of granularity assumed
by the SMA, which only captures variability at the institution level, and not the intra-
variability within the institution at business unit levels explicitly. Choosing to model
at the institution level, rather than the units of measure or granularity of the fifty-six
Basel categories, reduces model interpretability and reduces risk responsivity of the
capital.
Conceptually, it relates to the simplification of the AMA under the SMA adopting
a top-down formulation that reduces OpRisk modeling to a single unit of measure,
as if all operational losses were following a single generating mechanism. This is
equivalent to considering that earthquakes, cyber-attacks and human errors are all
generated by the same drivers, and that they manifest in the loss model and loss
history in the same manner as other losses that are much more frequent and have lower
consequence, such as credit card fraud, when viewed from the institution level loss
experience. It follows quite obviously that the radical simplification and aggregation
of such heterogeneous risks in such a simplified model cannot claim the benefit of
risk-sensitivity, even remotely.
Therefore, the SMA fails to achieve the claimed objective of capital risk sensitivity.
Capital produced by the proposed SMA will be neither stable nor related to the risk
profile of an institution. Moreover, the SMA induces risk-taking behaviors, and thus
fails to achieve the Basel Committee objectives of stability and soundness of the
financial institutions. Moral hazard and other unintended consequences include the
following.
More risk-taking. Without the possibility of capital reduction for better risk manage-
ment, in the face of increased funding costs due to the rise in capital, it is predictable
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that financial institutions will raise their risk-taking to a level that is sufficient to pay
for the increased cost of the new fixed capital. The risk appetite of a financial insti-
tution would mechanically increase. This effect goes against the Basel Committee
objective of having a safe and secured financial system.
Denying loss events. While incident data collection involves a constant effort over
a decade in every institution, large or small, the SMA is the most formidable
disincentive to report losses. There are many opportunities to compress historical
losses such as ignoring, slicing or transferring to other risk categories. The wish
expressed in the Basel consultation that “banks should use ten years of good-quality
loss data” is actually meaningless if the collection can be gamed. Besides, what
about new banks, or BIA banks that do not currently have a loss data collection
process?
Hazard of reduced provisioning activity. Provisions, which should be a substitution
for capital, are vastly discouraged by the SMA, as they are penalized twice, counted
both in the BI and the losses, and not accounted for as a capital reduction. The SMA
captures both the expected loss and the unexpected loss, when the regulatory capital
should only reflect the unexpected loss. We believe that this confusion might come
from the use of the OpCar model as a benchmark, because the OpCar captures both
equally. The SMA states in the definition of gross loss, net loss and recovery in
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2016, Section 6.2, p. 10) under item
(c) that the gross loss and net loss should include “provisions or reserves accounted
for in the P&L against the potential operational loss impact”. This clearly indicates
the nature of the double counting of this component, since they will enter in the BI
through the P&L and in the loss data component of the SMA capital.
Ambiguity in provisioning and resulting capital variability. The new guidelines on
provisioning under the SMA framework follow a similar general concept to those
that recently came into effect in credit risk with the International Financial Report-
ing Standard (IFRS 9). This was set forward by the International Accounting
Standards Board (IASB), who completed the final element of its comprehensive
response to the financial crisis with the publication of IFRS 9 Financial Instruments
in July 2014. The IFRS 9 guidelines explicitly outline in Phase 2 an impairment
framework, which specifies in a standardized manner how to deal with delayed
recognition of (in this case) credit losses on loans (and other financial instruments).
IFRS 9 achieves this through a new expected loss impairment model that will require
more timely recognition of expected credit losses. Specifically, the new standard
requires entities to account for expected credit losses from when financial instru-
ments are first recognized, and it lowers the threshold for recognition of full lifetime
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expected losses. However, the SMA OpRisk version of such a provisioning con-
cept for OpRisk losses fails to provide such a standardized and rigorous approach.
Instead, the SMA framework simply states that loss databases should now include:
Losses stemming from operational risk events with a definitive financial impact,
which are temporarily booked in transitory and/or suspense accounts and are not
yet reflected in the P&L (“pending losses”). Material pending losses should be
included in the SMA loss data set within a time period commensurate with the size
and age of the pending item.
Unlike the more specific IFRS 9 accounting standards, under the SMA there is
a level of ambiguity. Further, this ambiguity can propagate now directly into the
SMA capital calculation, causing the potential for capital variability and instability.
For instance, there is no specific guidance or regulation requirement to standardize
the manner in which a financial institution decides what is to be considered a
“definitive financial impact” and what they should consider as a threshold for
deciding on existence of a “material pending loss”. Also, the specific guidance
or rules about the time periods related to the inclusion of such pending losses in
an SMA loss data set, and, therefore, into the capital, are not stated. The current
guidance simply states that “material pending losses should be included in the SMA
loss data set within a time period commensurate with the size and age of the pending
item”. This is too imprecise, and it may lead to the manipulation of provisions
reporting and categorization that will directly reduce SMA capital over the averaged
time periods in which the loss data component is considered. Further, if different
financial institutions adopt different provisioning rules, the capital obtained for
two banks with identical risk appetites and similar loss experiences could differ
substantially as a result of their provisioning practices.
Imprecise guidance on timing loss provisioning. The SMA guidelines also introduce
the topic of “timing loss provisioning”, which they describe as follows:
Negative economic impacts booked in a financial accounting period, due to oper-
ational risk events impacting the cash flows or financial statements of previous
financial accounting periods (timing losses). Material “timing losses” should be
included in the SMA loss data set when they are due to operational risk events that
span more than one financial accounting period and give rise to legal risk.
However, we would argue that for standardization of a framework there needs to be
more explicit guidance as to what constitutes a “material timing loss”. Otherwise,
different timing loss provisioning approaches will result in different loss databases
and, consequently, differing SMA capital, just as a consequence of the provisioning
practice adopted. In addition, the ambiguity of this statement does not make it clear
whether such losses may be accounted for twice.
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Grouping of losses. Under previous AMA internal modeling approaches, the unit of
measurement or granularity of the loss modeling was reported according to the
fifty-six BL/ET categories specified in the Basel II framework. However, under
the SMA, the unit of measure is just at the institution level, so the granularity
of the loss processes modeling and interpretation is lost. This has consequences
when it is considered in light of the new SMA requirement that “losses caused
by a common operational risk event or by related operational risk events over
time must be grouped and entered into the SMA loss data set as a single loss.”
Previously, in internal modeling, losses within a given BL/ET would be recorded
as a random number (frequency model) of individual independent loss amounts
(severity model). Then, for instance, under an LDA model, such losses would
be aggregated only as a compound process, and the individual losses would not
be “grouped” except on the annual basis, and not on the per-event basis. How-
ever, there seems to be a marked difference in the SMA loss data reporting on
this point. Under the SMA, it is proposed to aggregate the individual losses
and report them in the loss database as a “single grouped” loss amount. This
is not advisable from a modeling or an interpretation and practical risk man-
agement perspective. Further, the SMA guidance states that “the bank’s internal
loss data policy should establish criteria for deciding the circumstances, types
of data and methodology for grouping data as appropriate for its business, risk
management and SMA regulatory capital calculation needs.” One could argue
that if the aim of the SMA was to standardize OpRisk loss modeling in order to
make capital less variable due to internal modeling decisions, then one can fail
to see how this will be achieved with imprecise guidance, such as that provided
above. One could argue that the above generic statement on criteria establish-
ment basically removes the internal modeling framework of the AMA and replaces
it with internal heuristic (non-model based, non-scientifically verifiable) rules to
“group” data. This has the potential to result in even greater variability in capital
than was experienced with non-standardized AMA internal models. At least under
AMA internal modeling, in principle, the statistical models could be scientifically
criticized.
Ignoring the future. All forward-looking aspects of risk identification, assessment
and mitigation, such as scenarios and emerging risks, have disappeared in the new
Basel consultation. This in effect introduces the risk of setting back the bank-
ing institutions in their progress toward a better understanding of threats; even
though such threats may be increasing in frequency and severity, and the bank
exposure to such threats may be increasing due to business practices, this cannot
be reflected in the SMA framework capital. In that sense, the SMA is only backward
looking.
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5 STANDARD MEASUREMENT APPROACH FAILS TO UTILIZE
RANGE OF DATA SOURCES OR PROVIDE RISK MANAGEMENT
INSIGHT
As with any scientific discipline, OpRisk modeling is no different when it comes
to developing a statistical modeling framework. In practical settings, it is therefore
important to set the context with respect to the data and the regulatory requirements
of Basel II when it comes to the data used in OpRisk modeling. In terms of the data
aspect of OpRisk modeling, it has been an ongoing challenge for banks to develop
suitable loss databases to record observed losses internally and externally, alongside
other important information that may aid in modeling.
A key process in OpRisk modeling has not just been the collection itself, but,
importantly, how and what to collect, as well as how to classify it. The first and key
phase in any analytical process, certainly in the case of OpRisk models, is to cast
the data into a form amenable to analysis. This is the very first task that an analyst
faces when they set out to model, measure and even manage OpRisk. At this stage,
there is a need to establish how the information available can be modeled to act as an
input in the analytical process that would allow proper risk assessment processes to be
developed. In risk management, and particularly in OpRisk, this activity is today quite
regulated, and the entire data process, from collection to maintenance and use, has
strict rules. In this sense, we see that qualitative and quantitative aspects of OpRisk
management cannot be dissociated, as they act on one another in a causal manner.
Any OpRisk modeling framework starts by having solid risk taxonomy, so risks
are properly classified. Firms also need to perform a comprehensive risk mapping
across their processes to make sure that no risk is left out of the measurement process.
This risk mapping is particularly important, as it directly affects the granularity of the
modeling, the features observed in the data, the ability to interpret the loss model out-
puts and the ability to collect and model data. Further, it can affect the risk sensitivity
of the models. It is a process that all large financial institutions have gone through at
great cost of manpower and time in order to comply with Basel II regulations.
Under the Basel II regulations, there are four major data elements that should be
used to measure and manage OpRisk: internal loss data, external loss data, scenario
analysis, and business environment and internal control factors (BEICFs).
To ensure that data is correctly specified in an OpRisk modeling framework, one
must undertake a risk mapping or taxonomy exercise, which basically encompasses
the following: description, identification, nomenclature and classification. This is a
very lengthy and time-consuming process that has typically been done by many banks
at a fairly fine level of granularity with regard to the business structure. It involves
going through, in excruciating detail, every major process of the firm. The outcome
of this exercise would be the building block of any risk classification study. We also
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observe that, in practice, this task is complicated by the fact that, in OpRisk settings,
often when a risk materializes, and until it is closed, the loss process will continue
to evolve over time – sometimes for many years, if we consider legal cases. In some
cases, the same list of incidents taken at two different time points will not have the
same distribution of loss magnitude. Here, it is important to bear in mind that a risk
is not a loss: we may have risk and never experience an incident, and we may have
incidents and never experience a loss. These considerations should also be taken into
account when developing a classification or risk-mapping process.
There are roughly three ways that firms drive this risk taxonomy exercise: through
cause, impact or events. The event-driven risk classification is probably the most
common one used by large firms and has been the emerging best practice in OpRisk.
This process classifies risk according to OpRisk events. This is the classification used
by the Basel Committee, for which a detailed breakdown into event types at level 1,
level 2 and activity groups is provided in Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
(2006, pp. 305–307). Further, it is generally accepted that this classification has a def-
inition broad enough to make it easier to accept/adopt changes in the process, should
they arise. Besides, it is very interesting to note that a control taxonomy may impact
the perception of events in the risk taxonomy, especially if the difference between
inherent and residual risk is not perfectly understood. The residual risks are defined
as inherent risk controls, ie, once we have controls in place, we manage the residual
risks, while we may still be reporting inherent risks; this may bias the perception of
the bank risk profile. The risk/control relationship (in terms of taxonomy) is not that
easy to handle, as risk owners and control owners might be in completely different
departments, preventing a smooth transmission of information. This we believe also
needs further consideration in emerging best practice and governance implications
for OpRisk management best practice.
5.1 The elements of the OpRisk framework
The four key elements that should be used in any OpRisk framework are internal loss
data, external loss data, BEICFs and scenario analysis.
In terms of OpRisk losses, typically, the definition means a gross monetary loss
or a net monetary loss, ie, a net of recoveries but excluding insurance or tax effects,
resulting from an operational loss event. An operational loss includes all expenses
associated with an operational loss event except for opportunity costs, forgone rev-
enue and costs related to risk management and control enhancements implemented to
prevent future operational losses. These losses need to be classified using the Basel
categories (and internal categories, if these are different from Basel’s) and mapped to
a firm’s business units. Basel II regulation says that firms need to collect at least five
years of data, but most decide not to discard any loss, even when these are older than
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this limit. Losses are difficult to acquire, and most even pay to supplement internal
losses with external loss databases. Considerable challenges exist in collating a large
volume of data, in different formats and from different geographical locations, into a
central repository, as well as in ensuring that these data feeds are secure and can be
backed up and replicated in case of an accident.
There is also a considerable challenge with OpRisk loss data recording and reporting
related to the length for resolution of OpRisk losses. For some OpRisk events, usually
the largest, there will be a large interval between the inception of the event and final
closure, due to the complexity of these cases.As an example, most litigation cases that
came up from the financial crisis in 2007–8 were only settled by 2012–13. These legal
cases have their own life cycle and start with a discovery phase, in which lawyers and
investigators argue if the other party has a proper case to actually take the action to
court or not. At this stage, it is difficult to even come up with an estimate for eventual
losses. Even when a case is accepted by the judge, it might be several years until
lawyers and risk managers are able to properly estimate the losses.
Firms can set up reserves for these losses (and these reserves should be included
in the loss database), but they usually only do that a few weeks before the case is
settled in order to avoid disclosure issues (ie, the counterparty eventually knowing
the amount reserved and using this information to their advantage). This creates an
issue for setting up OpRisk capital: since firms would know that a large loss is coming,
but they cannot yet include it in the database, the inclusion of this settlement would
cause some volatility in the capital. The same would happen if a firm set a reserve of,
for example, US$1 billion for a case and then a few months later a judge decided in
the firm’s favor, and this large loss had to be removed. For this reason, firms need to
have a clear procedure on how to handle those large, long-duration losses.
The other issue with OpRisk loss reporting and recording is the aspect of adding
costs to losses. As mentioned, an operational loss includes all expenses associated
with an operational loss event except for opportunity costs, forgone revenue and costs
related to risk management and control enhancements implemented to prevent future
operational losses. Most firms, for example, do not have enough lawyers on payroll
(or of the expertise) to deal with all of the cases, particularly some of the largest or
those that demand some specific expertise and whose legal fees are quite high. There
will be cases in which the firm wins in the end, maybe due to external law firms, but
the cost can reach tens of millions of dollars. In this case, even with a court victory,
there will be an operational loss. This leads to the consideration of provisioning of
expected OpRisk losses, which is unlike credit risk, where the calculated expected
credit losses might be covered by general and/or specific provisions in the balance
sheet. For OpRisk, due to its multidimensional nature, the treatment of expected
losses is more complex and restrictive. Recently, with the issuing of IAS 37 by the
International Accounting Standards Board IFRS 2012, the rules have become clearer
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as to what might be subject to provisions (or not). IAS 37 establishes three specific
applications of these general requirements, namely that
 a provision should not be recognized for future operating losses,
 a provision should be recognized for an onerous contract – a contract in which
the unavoidable costs of meeting its obligations exceeds the expected economic
benefits,
 a provision for restructuring costs should be recognized only when an enterprise
has a detailed formal plan for restructuring and has raised a valid expectation
in those affected.
The last of these should exclude costs, such as retraining or relocating continuing
staff and marketing or investment in new systems and distribution networks; the
restructuring does not necessarily entail that. IAS 37 requires that provisions should
be recognized in the balance sheet when, and only when, an enterprise has a present
obligation (legal or constructive) as a result of a past event. The event must be likely
to call upon the resources of the institution to settle the obligation, and it must be
possible to form a reliable estimate of the amount of the obligation. Provisions in the
balance sheet should be at the best estimate of the expenditure required to settle the
present obligation at the balance sheet date. IAS 37 indicates also that the amount of
the provision should not be reduced by gains from the expected disposal of assets,
nor by expected reimbursements (arising from, for example, insurance contracts or
indemnity clauses). When and if it is virtually certain that reimbursement will be
received, should the enterprise settle the obligation, this reimbursement should be
recognized as a separate asset.
We also note the following key points relating to regulation regarding provision-
ing, capital and expected loss (EL) components in “Detailed criteria 669” (Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision 2006, p. 151). This portion of the regulation
describes a series of quantitative standards that will apply to internally generated
OpRisk measures for purposes of calculating the regulatory minimum capital charge.
(a) Any internal operational risk measurement system must be consistent with the
scope of operational risk defined by the Committee in paragraph 644 and the
loss event types defined in Annex 9.
(b) Supervisors will require the bank to calculate its regulatory capital requirement
as the sum of EL and unexpected loss (UL), unless the bank can demonstrate
that it is adequately capturing EL in its internal business practices. That is, to
base the minimum regulatory capital requirement on UL alone, the bank must
be able to demonstrate to the satisfaction of its national supervisor that it has
measured and accounted for its EL exposure.
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(c) A bank’s risk measurement system must be sufficiently “granular” to capture
the major drivers of operational risk affecting the shape of the tail of the loss
estimates.
Here, note that if EL was accounted for, ie, provisioned, then it should not be
covered by capital requirements again.
With regard to BEICF data, in order to understand the importance of BEICF data in
OpRisk practice, we discuss this data source in the form of key risk indicators (KRIs),
key performance indicators (KPIs) and key control indicators (KCIs).
A KRI is a metric of a risk factor. It provides information on the level of exposure
to a given OpRisk of the organization at a particular point in time. KRIs are useful
tools for business lines managers, senior management and boards to help monitor the
level of risk-taking in an activity or organization, with regard to their risk appetite.
Performance indicators, usually referred to as KPIs, measure performance or the
achievement of targets. Control effectiveness indicators, usually referred to as KCIs,
are metrics that provide information on the extent to which a given control is meeting
its intended objectives. Failed tests on key controls are natural examples of effective
KCIs.
KPIs, KRIs and KCIs overlap in many instances, especially when they signal
breaches of thresholds: a poor performance often becomes a source of risk. Poor
technological performance, such as system downtime, for instance, becomes a KRI
for errors and data integrity. KPIs of failed performance provide a good source of
potential risk indicators. Failed KCIs are even more obvious candidates for preventive
KRIs: a key control failure always constitutes a source of risk.
Indicators can be used by organizations as a means of control to track changes in
their exposure to OpRisk. When selected appropriately, indicators ought to flag any
change in the likelihood or the impact of a risk occurring. For financial institutions
that calculate and hold OpRisk capital under more advanced approaches, such as
the previous AMA internal model approaches, KPIs, KRIs and KCIs are advisable
metrics to capture BEICF. While the definition of BEICF differs from one jurisdiction
to another, and in many cases is specific to individual organizations, these factors must
 be risk sensitive (here, the notion of risk goes beyond incidents and losses),
 provide management with information on the risk profile of the organization,
 represent meaningful drivers of exposure that can be quantified,
 be used across the entire organization.
While some organizations include the outputs of their risk and control self-
assessment programs under their internal definition of BEICFs, indicators are an
Journal of Operational Risk www.risk.net/journal
Should AMA be replaced with SMA for operational risk 23
appropriate mechanism to satisfy these requirements, implying that there is an indi-
rect regulatory requirement to implement and maintain an active indicator program
(see the discussion in Chapelle (2013)).
For instance, incorporating BEICFs into OpRisk modeling is a reflection of the
modeling assumption that one can see OpRisk as a function of the control environ-
ment. If the control environment is fair and under control, large operational losses are
less likely to occur and OpRisk can be seen as under control. Therefore, understand-
ing the firm’s business processes, mapping the risks on these processes and assessing
how the controls implemented behave is the fundamental role of the OpRisk manager.
However, the SMA does not provide any real incentive mechanism, first for under-
taking such a process, and second for incorporating this valuable information into the
capital calculation.
5.2 SMA discards 75% of OpRisk data types
Both the Basel II and Basel III regulations emphasize the significance of incorporating
a variety of loss data into OpRisk modeling and, therefore, ultimately into capital
calculations. As has just been discussed, the four primary data sources to be included
are internal loss data, external loss data, scenario analysis and BEICF. However, under
the new SMA framework, only the first data source is utilized; the other three are now
discarded.
Further, even if this decision to drop BEICFs were reversed in revisions to the SMA
guidelines, we argue that this would not be easy to achieve. In terms of using pieces
of information such as BEICFs and scenario data, because under the SMA framework
the level of model granularity is only at the institution level, it does not easily lend
itself to the incorporation of these key OpRisk data sources.
To business line managers, KRIs help to signal a change in the level of risk exposure
associated with specific processes and activities. For quantitative modelers, KRIs are
a way of including BEICFs in OpRisk capital. However, since BEICF data does
not form a component of required data for the SMA model, there is no longer a
regulatory requirement or incentive under the proposed SMA framework to make
efforts to develop such BEICF data sources. This reduces the effectiveness of the risk
models through the loss of a key source of information. In addition, the utility of such
data for risk management practitioners and managers is reduced, as this data is no
longer collected with the same required scrutiny, including validation, data integrity
and maintenance and reporting, that was previously required forAMA internal models
using such data.
These key sources of OpRisk data are not included in the SMA and cannot easily
be incorporated into an SMA framework, even if there were a desire to do so due to
the level of granularity implied by the SMA. This makes capital calculations less risk
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sensitive. Further, the lack of scenario-based data incorporated into the SMA model
makes it less forward looking and anticipatory as an internal model-based capital
calculation framework.
6 THE STANDARDIZED MEASUREMENT APPROACH CAN BE A
SUPER-ADDITIVE CAPITAL CALCULATION
The SMA seems to have the unfortunate feature that it may produce capital at a group
level compared with the institutional level in a range of jurisdictions, which has the
property that it is super-additive. It might be introduced by the regulator on purpose
to encourage the splitting of very large institutions, though this is not stated in the
Basel Committee documents explicitly. In this section, we show several examples of
super-additivity and discuss its implications.
6.1 Examples of SMA super-additivity
Consider two banks with identical BI and LC. However, the first bank has only one
entity, while the second has two entities. The two entities of the second bank have the
same BI and the same LC, and those are equal to both half the BI and half the LC of
the first joint bank.
In case one, Table 3(a), we consider the situation of a bucket shift, where the SMA
capital obtained for the joint bank is €5771 million, while the sum of the SMA
capital obtained for the two entities of the second bank is only €5387 million. In
this example, the SMA does not capture a diversification benefit; on the contrary, it
assumes that the global impact of an incident is larger than the sum of the parts. Here,
the joint bank is in Bucket 5, while the entities appear in Bucket 4. In the second
case, Table 3(b), we consider no bucket shift between the joint bank (Bank 1) and the
two-entity bank (Bank 2). Bank 1 is in Bucket 5, and the entities of Bank 2 are in
Bucket 5 too. In this case, we see that the joint bank has an SMA capital of €11 937
million, whereas the two-entity bank has an SMA capital of €10 674 million. Again
there is a super-additive property.
Of course, in the examples in Table 3, we set BI and LC somewhat arbitrarily. So, in
the next example, we use BI implied by the 0.999 VaR of LDA. In particular, assume a
bank with a Poisson./– lognormal.; / risk profile at the top level. Then, calculate
the long-term average LC using (3.3) and the 0.999 VaR of the annual loss using (3.4),
and find the implied BI by matching SMA capital with the 0.999 VaR. Now, consider
the identical Bank 2 that splits into two similar independent entities that will have the
same LC and the same BI, both equal to half of the LC and half of the BI of the first
bank, which allows us to calculate SMA capital for each entity. Also note that, in this
case, the entities will have risk profiles Poisson.1
2
/– lognormal.; / each.
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TABLE 3 Super-additivity examples (all amounts are in € million).
(a) Bucket shift
Bank 1 Bank 2‚ …„ ƒ ‚ …„ ƒ
Component Group Entity 1 Entity 2
BI 32 000 16 000 16 000
BIC 6920 3120 3120
LC 4000 2000 2000
SMA 5771 2694 2694
Sum of SMAs: 5387
(b) No bucket shift
Bank 1 Bank 2‚ …„ ƒ ‚ …„ ƒ
Component Group Entity 1 Entity 2
BI 70 000 35 000 35 000
BIC 17 940 7790 7790
LC 4000 2000 2000
SMA 11 937 5337 5337
Sum of SMAs: 10 674
(a) Bank 1 is in Bucket 5 and the entities of Bank 2 are in Bucket 4. (b) Bank 1 and the entities of Bank 2 are in
Bucket 5.
Remark 6.1 The sum of K independent compound processes Poisson.i / with
severity Fi .x/, i D 1; : : : ; K, is a compound process Poisson./, with  D 1 C
   C K and severity
F.x/ D 1

F1.x/ C    C K

FK.x/I
(see, for example, Shevchenko 2011, Section 7.2, Proposition 7.1).
The results in the case of  D 10,  D 14,  D 2 are shown in Table 4. Here, the
SMA for Bank 1 is €2.13 billion, while the sum of SMAs of the entities of Bank 2
is €1.96 billion, demonstrating the sub-additivity feature. Note that, in this case, one
can also calculate the 0.999 VaR for each entity, which is €1.47 billion, while SMAs
for Entity 1 and Entity 2 are€983 million each. That is, the entities with SMA capital
are significantly undercapitalized compared with the LDA economic capital model;
this subject will be discussed more in Section 6.2.
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TABLE 4 Super-additivity example (all amounts are in € million).
Bank 1 Bank 2‚ …„ ƒ ‚ …„ ƒ
Group Entity 1 Entity 2
 10 5 5
 14 14 14
 2 2 2
BI 13 960 6980 6980
BIC 2 651 1166 1166
LC 1 321 661 661
SMA 2 133 983 983
LDA 2 133 1473 1473
BI for Bank 1 is implied by the 0.999 VaR of Poisson./–lognormal.; / risk profile (LDA).
Next, we state a mathematical expression that a bank could utilize in business
structure planning to decide, in the long term, if it will be advantageous under the
new SMA framework to split into two entities (or more) or remain in a given joint
structure, according to the cost of funding Tier I SMA capital.
Consider the long-term SMA capital behavior averaged over the long-term history
of the SMA capital for each case, both joint and disaggregated business models. Then,
from the perspective of a long-term analysis regarding restructuring, the following
expressions can be used to determine the point at which the SMA capital would be
super-additive. If it is super-additive in the long term, this would indicate that there is
therefore an advantage to splitting the institution in the long-run into disaggregated
separate components. Further, the expression provided allows one to maximize the
long-term SMA capital reduction that can be obtained under such a partitioning of
the institution into m separate disaggregated entities.
Proposition 6.2 (Conditions for super-additive SMA capital) Under the LDA
models with the frequency from Poisson.J/ and generic severity FX .xI J/, the
long-term average of the loss component fLC can be found using
fLC D   .7EŒX C 7EŒX j X > L C 5EŒX j X > H/; (6.1)
ie, the short-term empirical loss averages in SMA formula (2.2) are replaced
with the “long-term” average. We now denote the long-term average LC for a
bank as fLC.J;J/ and the long-term average LC for m bank entities after the
split as fLC.i ; i ; i /, i 2 f1; 2; : : : ; mg. Therefore, the long-term SMA capital
KSMA.BIJ; fLC.J;J// will be an explicit function of LDA model parameters .J;J/,
and the long-term SMA capital for the entity i is KSMA.BIi ; fLC.i ;i //. Hence, the
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SMA super-additive capital condition becomes
KSMA.BIJ; fLC.J;J//  mX
iD1
KSMA.BIi ; fLC.i ;i // > 0: (6.2)
The above condition is for a model-based restructuring, assuming each bank entity
is modeled generically by an LDA model. Structuring around such a model-based
assumption can be performed to determine optimal disaggregation of the institu-
tion to maximize capital cost reductions. Many severity distribution types will allow
calculation of the long-term LC in closed form. For example, in the case of the
Poisson–lognormal model, it is given by (3.3).
Of course, one can also use the above condition to perform maximization of the
capital reduction over the next year by replacing fLC with the observed LC calculated
from empirical sample averages of historical data, as required in the SMA formula,
avoiding explicit assumptions for severity and frequency distributions.
6.2 SMA super-additivity, macroprudential policy and systemic risk
In this section, we discuss the fact that the financial system is not invariant under
observation, that is, banks and financial institutions will respond in a rational manner
to maximize their competitive advantage. In particular, if new regulations allow and
indeed provide incentives for banks to take opportunities to reduce, for instance, the
cost of capital, they will generally act to do so. It is in this context that we introduce
in brief the relationship between the new SMA capital calculations and the broader
macroprudential view of the economy that the regulator holds.
It is generally acknowledged that the enhancement of the Basel II banking regula-
tions by the additions that Basel III accords brought to the table were largely driven by
a desire to impose greater macroprudential oversight on the banking system after the
2008 financial crisis. Indeed, the Basel III accords adopted an approach to financial
regulation aimed at mitigating the “systemic risk” of the financial sector as a whole;
we may adopt a generic high level definition of systemic risk as
the disruption to the flow of financial services that is (i) caused by an impairment of
all or parts of the financial system; and (ii) has the potential to have serious negative
consequences for the real economy.
This view of systemic risk is focused on disruptions that arise from events such as
the collapse of core banks or financial institutions in the banking sector, such as
what happened after the Lehman Brothers collapse leading to the wider systemic risk
problem of the 2008 financial crisis.
In response to reducing the likelihood of such a systemic risk occurrence, the
Basel III regulation imposed several components that are of relevance to macropru-
dential financial regulation. Under Basel III, banks’ capital requirements have been
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strengthened, and new liquidity requirements, a leverage cap and a countercyclical
capital buffer were introduced; these would remain in place under the new SMA
guidelines.
In addition, large financial institutions, ie, the largest and most globally active
banks, were required to hold a greater amount of capital, with an increased proportion
of this Tier I capital being more liquid and of greater creditworthiness, ie, “higher-
quality” capital. We note that this is consistent with a view of systemic risk reduction
based on a cross-sectional approach. For instance, under this approach, the Basel III
requirements sought to introduce systemic risk reduction macroprudential tools.These
included the following:
(a) countercyclical capital requirements, which were introduced with the purpose
of avoiding excessive balance-sheet shrinkage from banks in distress that may
transition from going concerns to gone concerns;
(b) caps on leverage in order to reduce or limit asset growth through a mechanism
that linked a banks’ assets to their equity;
(c) time variation in reserve requirements with procyclical capital buffers as a
means to control capital flows with prudential purposes.
In the United Kingdom, such Basel III macroprudential extensions are discussed in
detail in the summary of the speech given at the 27th Annual Institute of International
Banking Conference, Washington, by the Executive Director for Financial Stability
Strategy and Risk in the Financial Policy Committee at the Bank of England (www
.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2016/speech887.pdf).
Further, one can argue that several factors can contribute to the systemic risk buildup
in an economy, both locally and globally. One of these that is of relevance to discus-
sions on AMA internal modeling versus SMA models is the risk that arises from the
complexity of mathematical modeling being adopted in risk management and prod-
uct structuring/pricing. One can argue from a statistical perspective that in order to
scientifically understand the complex nature of OpRisk processes, and then respond
to them with adequate capital measures and risk mitigation policies and governance
structuring, it would be prudent to invest in some level of model complexity. However,
with such complexity comes a significant chance of misuse of such models for gaming
of the system to obtain competitive advantage via, for instance, achieving a reduction
in capital. This can inherently act as an unseen trigger for systemic risk, especially if
it is typically taking place in the larger, more substantial banks in the financial net-
work, as is the case under AMA Basel II internal modeling. Therefore, we have this
tension between reducing the systemic risk in the system due to model complexity
and actually understanding the risk processes scientifically. We argue that the SMA
Journal of Operational Risk www.risk.net/journal
Should AMA be replaced with SMA for operational risk 29
goes too far in simplifying the complexity of OpRisk modeling, rendering it unusable
for risk analysis and interpretation. However, perhaps model complexity reduction
could instead be reduced through AMA standardization of internal modeling practice,
something we will discuss in the conclusions of this paper.
In this section, we ask what role the SMA model framework can play in the context
of macroprudential systemic risk reduction. To address this question, we adopt the
SMA’s highly stylized view, as follows. We first consider the largest banks and finan-
cial institutions in the world. These entities are global and key nodes in the financial
network; sometimes they have been referred to as “too big to fail” institutions. It
is clear that the existence of such large financial institutions has both positive and
negative economic effects. However, from a systemic risk perspective, they can pose
problems for banking regulations both in local jurisdictions and globally.
There is, in general, an incentive to reduce the number of such dominant nodes in
the banking financial network when viewed from the perspective of reducing systemic
risk. So, the natural question that arises with regard to the SMA formulation is this:
does the new regulation incentivize disaggregation of large financial institutions and
banks, at least from the high-level perspective of the reduction of costs associated
with obtaining, funding and maintaining Tier I capital and liquidity ratios, which is
required under Basel III at present? In addition, if a super-additive capital is possible,
is it achievable for feasible and practically sensible disaggregated entities? Finally,
one could ask the following: does this super-additive SMA capital feature provide an
increasing reward in terms of capital reduction as the size of the institution increases?
We address these questions in the following stylized case studies, which illustrate
that, in fact, the SMA can be considered as a framework that will induce systemic risk
reductions from the perspective of providing potential incentives to reduce capital
costs through disaggregation of large financial institutions and banks in the global
banking network. However, we also observe that this may lead to significant under-
capitalization of the entities after disaggregation; for example, in the case already
discussed in Table 4 and considered in the next section (Figure 5).
6.3 SMA super-additivity is feasible and produces viable BI
For illustration, assume the joint institution is simply modeled by a Poisson–lognormal
model Poisson.J/– lognormal.J; J/, with parameters sub-indexed by J for the joint
institution and a BI for the joint institution denoted by BIJ. Further, we assume that if
the institution had split into m D 2 separate entities for Tier I capital reporting pur-
poses, then each would have its own stylized annual loss modeled by two independent
Poisson–lognormal models: Entity 1, modeled by Poisson.1/– lognormal.1; 1/,
and Entity 2, modeled by Poisson.2/– lognormal.2; 2/, with BI1 and BI2, respec-
tively. Here, we assume that the disaggregation of the joint institution can occur in
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such a manner that the risk profile of each individual entity may adopt more, less or
equal risk aversion, governance and risk management practices. This means that there
are really no restrictions on the parameters 1, 1 and 1, nor on the parameters 2,
2 and 2 from the perspective of J, J and J.
In this sense, we study the range of parameters and BI values that will provide an
incentive for large institutions to reduce systemic risk by undergoing disaggregation
into smaller institutions. We achieve this through consideration of the SMA super-
additivity condition in Proposition 6.2. In this case, it leads us to consider
KSMA.BIJ; fLC.J; J; J//  2X
iD1
KSMA.BIi ; fLC.i ; i ; i // > 0: (6.3)
Using this stylized condition, banks may be able to determine, for instance, if in
the long term it would be economically efficient to split their institution into two or
more separate entities. Further, they can use this expression to optimize the capital
reduction for each of the individual entities, relative to the combined entities SMA
capital. Hence, what we show here is the long-term average behavior, which will be
the long-run optimal conditions for split or merge.
We perform a simple analysis below, where, at present, the joint institution is
modeled by an LDA model, with frequency given by Poisson.J D 10/ and severity
given by lognormal.J D 12; J D 2:5/, and with a BI implied by the 0.999 VaR of
the LDA model, as detailed in Table 2, giving BI D €14:24 billion. We then assume
the average number of losses in each institution if the bank splits into two is given
by 1 D 10 and 2 D 10. In addition, the scale of the losses changes, but the tail
severity of large losses is unchanged, such that 1 D 2:5 and 2 D 2:5, but 1 and
2 are unknown. We also calculate BI1 and BI2 implied by the LDA 0.999 VaR for
the given values of 1 and 2. Then, we determine the set of values of 1 and 2,
such that condition (6.3) is satisfied.
Table 5 shows the range of values for which 1 and 2 will produce super-additive
capital structures and therefore justify disaggregation from the perspective of SMA
capital cost minimization. We learn from this analysis that, indeed, it is plausible to
structure a disaggregation of a large financial institution into a smaller set of financial
institutions under the SMA capital structure. That is, the range of parameters 1 and
2 that produce super-additive capital structures under the SMA formulation setup
are plausible, and the BI values are plausible for such a decomposition. In Table 5, we
also show the BI values for Entity 1, implied in the cases satisfying the super-additive
SMA capital condition.
We see from these results that the ranges of BI values that are inferred under the
super-additive capital structures are also plausible ranges of values. This demonstrates
that it is practically feasible for the SMA to produce incentive to reduce capital by
disaggregation of larger institutions into smaller ones.
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TABLE 5 Implied BI in €billions for Entity 1 (N/A indicates no super-additive solution).
2‚ …„ ƒ
1 8 9 10 11 12 13
8 0.301 0.301 0.301 0.301 N/A N/A
9 0.820 0.820 0.820 0.820 N/A N/A
10 2.406 2.406 2.406 2.406 N/A N/A
11 5.970 5.970 5.970 5.970 N/A N/A
12 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
13 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
6.4 Does SMA incentivize larger institutions to disaggregate more
than smaller institutions?
Finally, we complete this section by addressing the following question: is there an
increase in potential capital reductions through using super-additive SMA capital as a
motivation to disaggregate into smaller firms as the size of the institution increases?As
the tail of the bank loss distribution increases, the size of the institution as quantified
through BI increases, and we are interested in seeing if there is an increase in incentive
for larger banks to disaggregate to reduce capital charge.
To illustrate this point, we perform a study in which we use the following setup.
We assume that we have a bank with a Poisson./– lognormal.; / operational
risk profile at the institution level. Now, we calculate fLC and match the LDA VaR
capital measure via the SLA at the 99.9% quantile to the SMA capital to imply
the corresponding BI, BIC and SMA D KSMA.BI; fLC/ capital. Next, we consider
disaggregating the institution into two similar independent components, which we
denote as Entity 1 and Entity 2. This means the entities will have fLC1 D fLC2 D 12 fLC,
BI1 D BI2 D 12BI, 1 D 2 D 12, 1 D 2 D  and 1 D 2 D  (see
Remark 6.1). Then, we calculate the SMA capitals SMA1 D KSMA.BI1; fLC1/ and
SMA2 D KSMA.BI2; fLC2/ for Entity 1 and Entity 2, and we find the absolute super-
additivity benefit from SMA capital reduction  D SMA  SMA1  SMA2 and
relative benefit =SMA. The results in the case  D 10,  D 14 and varying 
are plotted in Figure 4. Note that the benefit is the non-monotonic function of  ,
because in some cases the disaggregation process results in the entities shifting into
a different SMA capital bucket compared with the original joint entity. One can also
see that the absolute benefit from a bank disaggregation increases as the bank size
increases, though the relative benefit drops. In the same figure, we also show the
results for the case of bank disaggregation into ten similar independent entities, ie,
1 D    D 10 D =10, 1 D    D 10 D  and 1 D    D 10 D  .
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FIGURE 4 Absolute (in € million) and relative super-additivity benefits from splitting a
bank into two similar entities (and into ten similar entities) versus the lognormal severity
shape parameter  .
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FIGURE 5 Absolute (in € million) and relative undercapitalization of the entities after
bank disaggregation into two similar entities (and into ten similar entities) versus lognormal
severity shape parameter  .
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We also calculate the 0.999 VaR of the Poisson–lognormal process, denoted as
LDA1 and LDA2 for Entity 1 and Entity 2, respectively, using SLA (3.4). Then,
we find undercapitalization of the entities LDA1 C LDA2  SMA1  SMA1, intro-
duced by disaggregation, and corresponding relative undercapitalization, .LDA1 C
LDA2  SMA1  SMA1/=.LDA1 C LDA2/. These results (and also for the case of
bank disaggregation into ten similar entities) are shown in Figure 5. In this example,
undercapitalization is very significant, and it increases for larger banks, although the
relative undercapitalization gets smaller. Moreover, both the super-additivity benefit
and undercapitalization features become more pronounced in the case of splitting into
ten entities when compared with the two-entity split.
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Thus, from one perspective, the capital calculated using the SMA formula encour-
ages large banks to disaggregate (reducing the possibility of systemic risk from failure
in the banking network); however, from another perspective, it introduces the signifi-
cant undercapitalization of newly formed smaller entities, increasing their chances of
failure (ie, increasing systemic risk in the banking system). In light of our analysis,
it becomes clear that there is a downward pressure on banks to disaggregate, which
reduces some aspects of systemic risk in the banking network. However, we also show
that, at the same time, this very mechanism may undercapitalize the resulting smaller
institutions, which would in turn increase systemic risk. The final outcome of the
stability of the banking network will therefore depend largely on how aggressively
larger banks choose to seek capital reductions at the risk of undercapitalizing their
disaggregated entities, ie, their risk appetite in this regard will dictate the ultimate
outcome. Such an uncertain future is surely not what the regulator had in mind in
allowing for an incentive for disaggregation through the existence of super-additive
capital measures.
7 OPCAR ESTIMATION FRAMEWORK
This section summarizes details of the OpCar model, which is the precursor to the
SMA model and helped to form the SMA structure. First, we point out that the
proposed OpCar model (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2014, Annex 2)
is based on the LDA, albeit a very simplistic one that models the annual loss of the
institution as a single LDA model formulation
Z D
NX
iD1
Xi ; (7.1)
where N is the annual number of losses modeled as random variables from the
Poisson distribution, Poisson./, ie,  D EŒN , and Xi is the loss severity random
variable from distribution FX .xI /, parameterized by vector  . It is assumed that
N and Xi are independent and X1; X2; : : : are independent too (note that modeling
severities with autocorrelation is possible; see, for example, Guégan and Hassani
(2013)). FX .xI / is modeled by one of the following two-parameter distributions:
Pareto, lognormal, log-logistic or log-gamma. Three variants of the Pareto model were
considered, informally described in the regulation as corresponding to Pareto-light,
Pareto-medium and Pareto-heavy. As a result, up to six estimates of the 0.999 VaR
that were generated per bank were averaged to find the final capital estimate used in
the regression model.
Next, we outline the OpCar fitting procedure and highlight potential issues.
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7.1 Parameter estimation
The proposed OpCar model is estimated using data collected in a quantitative impact
study (QIS) performed by the Basel Committee. Specifically, for each bank in the
data set over T D 5 years corresponding to the 2005–9 period, the following data is
used.
 Qni : the annual number of losses above Qu D €10 000 in year i 2 f1; : : : ; T g.
 ni : the annual number of losses above u D €20 000 in year i 2 f1; : : : ; T g.
 Si : the sum of losses above the level u D €20 000 in year i 2 f1; : : : ; T g.
 Mi : the maximum individual loss in year i 2 f1; : : : ; T g.
The hybrid parameter estimation assumes that the frequency and severity distribu-
tions are unchanged over five years. Then, the following statistics are defined:
u WD EŒN j X > u D .1  FX .uI //; (7.2)
 Qu WD EŒN j X > Qu D .1  FX . QuI //; (7.3)
u WD E ŒX j X > u; (7.4)
which are estimated using observed frequencies ni and Qni , and aggregated losses Si ,
as
Ou D 1
T
TX
iD1
ni ; O Qu D 1
T
TX
iD1
Qni ; Ou D
PT
iD1 SiPT
iD1 ni
: (7.5)
The conditional mean u and severity distribution FX .I / are known in closed
form for the selected severity distribution types (see Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision 2014, p. 26, Table A.5). Then, in the case of lognormal, log-gamma,
log-logistic and Pareto-light distributions, the following two equations are solved to
find severity parameter estimates O:
O Qu
Ou
D 1  FX . QuI
O/
1  FX .uI O/
and Ou D E O ŒX j X > u; (7.6)
which are referred to as the percentile and moment conditions, respectively. Finally,
the Poisson  parameter is estimated as
O D
Ou
1  FX .uI O/
: (7.7)
In the case of Pareto-heavy severity, the percentile condition in (7.6) is replaced by
the “maximum heavy condition”
FX jX> Qu. O.1/M I O/ D
Qn
Qn C 1; O
.1/
M D max.M1; : : : ;MT /I (7.8)
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in the case of Pareto-medium severity, the percentile condition is replaced by the
“maximum medium condition”
FX jX> Qu. O.2/M I O/ D
Qn
Qn C 1; O
.2/
M D
1
T
TX
jD1
Mj : (7.9)
Here, FX jX> Qu./ is the distribution of losses conditional to exceed Qu. An explicit
definition of Qn is not provided in Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2014,
Annex 2), but it is reasonable to assume Qn D .1=T /PTiD1 Qni in (7.9) and Qn DPT
iD1 Qni in (7.8).
These maximum conditions are based on the following result and approximation,
stated in Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2014). Denote the ordered loss
sample X1;n 6    6 Xn;n, ie, Xn;n D max.X1; : : : ; Xn/. Using the fact that
FX .Xi / D Ui is uniformly distributed, we have EŒFX .Xk;n/ D k=.n C 1/ and,
thus,
EŒFX .Xn;n/ D n
n C 1: (7.10)
Therefore, when n ! 1, one can expect that
EŒFX .Xn;n/  FX ŒE.Xn;n/; (7.11)
which gives conditions (7.8) and (7.9) when E.Xn;n/ is replaced by its estimators O.1/M
and O.2/M , and conditional distributionFX jX> Qu./ is used instead ofFX ./ to account for
loss truncation below Qu. Here, we would like to note that, strictly speaking, under the
OpRisk settings, n is random from Poisson distribution corresponding to the annual
number of events that may have implications for the above maximum conditions.
Also, note that the distribution of maximum loss in the case of Poisson-distributed n
can be found in closed form (see Shevchenko 2011, Section 6.5).
We are not aware of results in the literature regarding the properties (such as accu-
racy, robustness and appropriateness) of estimators O calculated in the above described
way. Note that it is mentioned in Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2014)
that if the numerical solution for O does not exist for a model, then this model is
ignored.
The OpCar framework takes a five-year sample of data to perform sample estimation
when fitting the models. We note that making an estimation of this type with only five
years of data for the annual loss of the institution and fitting the model to this sample
is going to result in very poor accuracy. This can then easily translate into non-robust
results from the OpCar formulation if recalibration of the framework is performed in
future.
At this point, we emphasize that a five-sample estimate is very inaccurate for these
quantities; in other words, the estimated model parameters will have a very large
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uncertainty associated with them. This is particularly problematic for parameters
related to kurtosis and tail index in subexponential severity models. This is proba-
bly why the heuristic, practically motivated rejection criterion for model fitting was
applied, in order to reject inappropriate fits (not in a statistical manner) that did not
work due to the very small sample sizes used in this estimation.
To illustrate the extent of the uncertainty present in these five-year sample estimates,
we provide the following basic case study. Consider a Poisson–lognormal LDA model
with parameters  D 1000,  D 10 and  D 2 simulated over m D 1000 years. The
VaR0:999 for this model given by the SLA (3.4) is 4:59  108. Then, we calculate
population statistics for each year ni , Qni and Si , i D 1; : : : ; m, and form T -year
non-overlapping blocks of these statistics from the simulated m years in order to
perform estimation of distribution parameters for each block using percentile and
moment conditions (7.6). Formally, for each block, we have to numerically solve two
equations,
O1 WD ˚
 O  ln.eu/
O

˚
 O  ln.u/
O
1

O Qu
Ou
D 0;
O2 WD exp

O C O
2
2

˚
 O C O2  ln.u/
O

˚
 O  ln.u/
O
1
 Ou D 0;
(7.12)
in order to find the severity parameter estimates O and O , which are then substituted
into (7.7) to get the estimate O. Here, O Qu, Ou and Ou are the observed statistics (7.5)
for a block.
This system of nonlinear equations may not have a unique solution, or a solu-
tion may not exist. Thus, to find an approximate solution, we consider two different
objective functions.
 Objective function 1: a univariate objective function given by O21 C O22 that
we minimize to find the solution.
 Objective function 2: a multi-objective function to obtain the Pareto optimal
solution by finding the solution such that jO1j and jO2j cannot be jointly better
off.
In both cases, a simple grid search over equally spaced values of O and O was used
to avoid any other complications that may have arisen with other optimization tech-
niques. This leads to the most robust solution, which is not sensitive to gradients or
starting points. A summary of the results for parameter estimates and the correspond-
ing VaR0:999 in the case of five-year blocks (ie, Œm=T  D 200 independent blocks)
is provided in Table 6.
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TABLE 6 Mean of OpCar model parameter estimates over 200 independent five-year
blocks if data is simulated from Poisson.1000/–lognormal.10,2/.
Grid 1: O 2 Œ8;12, O 2 Œ1;3, ı O D 0.05, ı O D 0.05
Objective Objective
Parameter function function
estimate 1 2
O 10.12(1.26) 9.35(1.03)
O 1.88(0.46) 2.16(0.28)
O 3248(5048) 959(290)
OVaR0.999 10.6.13.4/  108 4.70.0.88/  108
Grid 2: O 2 Œ6;14, O 2 Œ0.5;3.5, ı O D 0.05, ı O D 0.05
Objective Objective
Parameter function function
estimate 1 2
O 9.79(1.94) 8.85(1.82)
O 1.88(0.71) 2.26(0.48)
O 1.18.11.1/  108 1.5.21/  107
OVaR0.999 3.84.36.8/  1013 4.34.61/  1012
The mean of sample statistics Ou, O Qu and Ou over the blocks used for parameter estimates are 654(11), 519(10) and
3.03.0.27/  105, respectively, with the corresponding standard deviations provided in brackets next to the mean.
The square root of the mean-squared error of the parameter estimator is provided in brackets next to the mean.
The results are presented for two search grids with different bounds but the same
spacing between the grid points ı O D 0:05 and ı O D 0:05. Here, VaR0:999 is calcu-
lated using SLA (3.4). These results clearly show that this estimation procedure is not
appropriate. We note that, in some instances (for some blocks), both objective func-
tions produce the same parameter estimates for common sample estimate inputs O Qu,
Ou and Ou; these estimates are close to the true values, although this is not systemati-
cally the case. We suspect that the reason for this is that, in some instances, there may
be no solution in existence (or multiple solutions), and this then manifests in different
solutions for the two objective functions (or inappropriate solutions). This is a serious
concern for the accuracy of the findings from this approach; it suggests and is a key
reason why other approaches to calibration at more granular levels (where more data
is available) are often used – or, in cases where events are very rare, why alternative
sources of data such as KRI, KPI, KCI and expert opinions should be incorporated
into the calibration of the LDA model.
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7.2 Capital estimation
The second stage of the OpCar framework is to take the fitted model parameters for
the LDA model severity and frequency models at group or institution level and then
calculate the capital. The approach to capital calculation under the OpCar analysis
involves the so-called SLA. Here, we note that it would have been more accurate
and easier to perform the capital calculations numerically, using methods such as
Panjer recursion, FFT or Monte Carlo (see the detailed discussion of such approaches
provided in Cruz et al (2015)).
Instead, the BCBS decided upon the following SLA to estimate the 0.999 quantile
of the annual loss:
F 1Z .˛/  F 1X

1  1  ˛


C .  1/EŒX; (7.13)
which is valid asymptotically for ˛ ! 1 in the case of subexponential severity
distributions. Here, F 1X ./ is the inverse of the distribution function of the random
variable X . It is important to point out that a correct SLA (in the case of finite mean
subexponential severity and Poisson frequency) is actually given by a slightly different
formula
F 1Z .˛/ D F 1X

1  1  ˛


C EŒX C o.1/: (7.14)
This is a reasonable approximation, but it is important to note that its accu-
racy depends on distribution type and values of distribution parameters, and that
further higher-order approximations are available (see the detailed discussion in
Peters and Shevchenko (2015, Section 8.5.1) and the tutorial paper Peters et al
(2013)).
To illustrate the accuracy of this first-order approximation for the annual lossVaR at
a level of 99.9%, consider the Poisson./– lognormal.; / model with parameters
 D f10; 100; 1000g,  D 3 and  D f1; 2g; note that parameter  is a scale
parameter and will not affect relative differences in VaR. Then, we calculate the VaR
of the annual loss from an LDA model for each of the possible sets of parameters,
using a Monte Carlo simulation of 107 years that gives very good accuracy. We then
evaluate the SLA approximation for each set of parameters.A summary of the findings
is provided in Table 7.
The results indicate that though the SLA accuracy is good, the error can be signif-
icant for the parameters of interest for OpCar modeling. This can lead to a material
impact on the accuracy of the parameter estimation in the subsequent regression
undertaken by the OpCar approach and the resulting SMA formula.
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TABLE 7 Accuracy of the SLA approximation of VaR0.999 in the case of a Poisson./–
lognormal.; / model, with the scale parameter  D 3.
Parameters MC VaR SLA VaR  VaR .%/
 D 1000;  D 1 3.88  104.0.02%/ 3.54  104 3.4  103 8.7
 D 1000;  D 2 4.24  105.0.28%/ 4.19  105 5.3  103 1.3
 D 100;  D 1 5.42  103.0.06%/ 4.74  103 6.8  102 12.5
 D 100;  D 2 1.17  105.0.4%/ 1.17  105 6.2  102 0.52
 D 10;  D 1 1.27  103.0.15%/ 1.16  103 1.1  102 8.7
 D 10;  D 2 3.57  104.0.52%/ 3.56  104 0.8  102 0.23
 VaR is the difference between the SLA approximation and Monte Carlo estimate (the standard error of the Monte
Carlo approximation is in brackets next to the estimate). .%/ is the relative difference between the SLA and Monte
Carlo estimates.
7.3 Model selection and model averaging
The OpCar methodology attempts to fit six different severity models to the data, as
described in the previous section, that generate up to six 0.999 VaR SLA estimates for
each bank, depending on whether the models survived the imposed “filters”. Then,
the final estimate of the 0.999 VaR is found as an average of VaR estimates from the
models that survived.
We would like to comment on the “filters” that were used to select the models to
be used for a bank after the estimation procedures were completed. These heuristic
ad hoc filters are not based on statistical theory and are determined by the following
criteria:
 whether the proportion of losses above €20 000 is within a certain range (1–
40%);
 whether the ratio between loss frequency and total assets is within a certain
range (0.1–70 losses per billion euros of assets);
 whether the model estimation (outlined in Section 7.1) that was based on
iterative solution converged.
We believe that in addition to practical considerations, other more rigorous statistical
approaches to model selection could also be considered. For instance, Dutta and Perry
(2006) discuss the importance of fitting distributions that are flexible but appropriate
for the accurate modeling of OpRisk data. They focussed on the following five simple
attributes in deciding on a suitable statistical model for the severity distribution.
 Good fit: statistically, how well does the model fit the data?
 Realistic: if a model fits well in a statistical sense, does it generate a loss
distribution with a realistic capital estimate?
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 Well specified: are the characteristics of the fitted data similar to the loss data
and logically consistent?
 Flexible: how well is the model able to reasonably accommodate a wide variety
of empirical loss data?
 Simple: is the model easy to apply in practice, and is it easy to generate random
numbers for the purposes of loss simulation?
Further, in Cruz et al (2015, Chapter 8) there is a detailed description of appropriate
model selection approaches that can be adopted in OpRisk modeling. These have
been specifically developed for the setting that involves rigorous statistical methods
and avoids heuristic methods.
The results of the heuristic filters applied in OpCar excluded a large number of
distribution fits from the models for each institution. It was stated in Basel Commit-
tee on Banking Supervision (2014, p. 22) that the “OpCar calculator was run and
validated on a sample of 121 out of 270 QIS banks which were able to provide data
on operational risk losses of adequate quality” and “four of the distributions (lognor-
mal, log-gamma, Pareto-medium and Pareto-heavy) were selected for the final OpCar
calculation around 20% of the time or less”.
7.4 OpCar regression analysis
Finally, we discuss aspects of regression in OpCar methodology based on the OpCar
parameter and VaR estimation outlined in the previous section. Basically, for each
bank’s approximated capital, the regression is performed against a range of factors
in a linear and nonlinear regression formulation. Given the potential for significant
uncertainty in all aspects of the OpCar framework presented above, we argue that
results from this remaining analysis may be spurious or biased, and we would recom-
mend further study of this aspect. Further, these approximation errors will propagate
into the regression parameter estimation in a nonlinear manner, making it difficult to
directly determine the effect of such inaccuracies.
The regression models considered come in two forms: linear and nonlinear regres-
sions. Given the sample of J banks on which to perform the regression, consider
.Yj ; X1;j ; : : : ; X20;j /, j D 1; : : : ; J , where Yj is the j th banks capital (dependent
variable) obtained from the two-stage procedure described in Sections 7.2 and 7.1.
Here, Xi;j is the i th factor or covariate (independent variable) derived from the bal-
ance sheet and income statement of the j th bank. OpCar methodology considered
twenty potential covariates. Only one observation of dependent variable Yj per bank
was used, and thus only one observation for each independent variable Xi;j was
needed and approximated by the average over QIS reporting years.
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Then, the linear regression model considered in OpCar was specified by the model
Yj D b0 C
20X
iD1
biXi;j C j ; (7.15)
with independent and identically distributed (iid) errors 1; : : : ; J, which are from
normal distribution with zero mean and the same variance.
In this particular, practical application, it is unlikely that the regression assumption
of homoscedastic error variance is appropriate. We comment that the failure of this
assumption, which is likely to be true, given the heterogeneity of the banks considered,
would have caused spurious results in the regression analysis. Note that “outliers” were
removed in the analysis, but no indication of what were considered to be outliers was
mentioned. This again would have biased the results. We would have suggested not
arbitrarily trying to force homoscedastic errors but instead considering weighted least
squares if there was concern about outliers.
The regression analysis undertaken by the OpCar analysis and then utilized as a
precursor to the SMA formulation implicitly assumes that all bank capital figures,
used as responses (dependent variables) in the regression analysis against the factors
(independent variables), such as BI for each bank, come from a common population.
This is demonstrated by the fact that the regression is done across all banks jointly,
and thereby a common regression error distribution type is assumed. This would
probably not be the case in practice. We believe that other factors, such as banking
volume, banking jurisdiction, banking practice and banking risk management gov-
ernance structures, can have significant influences on this potential relationship. To
some extent, the BI is supposed to capture aspects of this, but it cannot capture all of
these aspects. Therefore, it may be the case that the regression assumptions about the
error distribution, typically its having iid zero mean homoscedastic (constant) variance
and normal distribution, would probably be questionable. Unfortunately, this would
then directly affect all the analysis of significance of the regression relationships, the
choice of the covariates to use in the model, etc.
It is very odd to think that, in the actual OpCar analysis, the linear regression model
(7.15) was further reduced to the simplest type of linear regression model in the form
of a simple linear model subfamily, given by
Yj D b0 C biXi;j C j ; (7.16)
ie, only simple linear models and not generalized linear model types were considered.
This is unusual, as the presence of multiple factors and their interactions can often
significantly improve the analysis, and it is simple to perform estimation in such cases.
It is surprising to see this very limiting restriction in the analysis.
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The second form of regression model considered in OpCar was nonlinear. It is
given by the functional relationships
R.x/ D xF.x/;
d
dx
R.x/ D F.x/ C xF 0.x/;
d2
dx2
R.x/ D 2F 0.x/ C xF 00.x/; (7.17)
where x is the proxy indicator, R.x/ represents the total OpRisk requirement (capital)
and F.x/ is the functional coefficient relationship for any level x. It is assumed that
F./ is twice differentiable. The choice of function F.x/ selected is given by
F.x/ D  .x  A/
1˛
1  ˛ ; (7.18)
with ˛ 2 Œ0; 1,  > 0 and A 6 0.
This model and the way it is described in the Basel consultative document is incom-
plete in the sense that it fails to adequately explain how multiple covariates were
incorporated into the regression structure. It seems that, again, only single covari-
ates are considered, one at a time; we again emphasize that this is a very limited
and simplistic approach to performing such an analysis. There are standard software
R packages that would have extended this analysis to multiple covariate regression
structures, which we argue would have been much more appropriate.
Now, in the nonlinear regression model, if one takes R.xi / D Yi , ie, the i th bank’s
capital figure, this model could in principle be reinterpreted as a form of quantile
regression model, such as those discussed recently in Cruz et al (2015). In this case,
the response is the quantile function, and the function F would have been selected
as a transform of a quantile error function, such as the class of Tukey transforms
discussed in Peters et al (2016).
The choice of function F.x/ adopted by the modelers was just a translated and
scaled power quantile error function of the type discussed in Dong et al (2015, Equa-
tion 14). When interpreting the nonlinear model in the form of a quantile regression,
it is documented in several places (see the discussion in Peters et al (2016)) that least
squares estimation is not a very good choice for parameter estimation for such models.
Yet, this is the approach adopted in the OpCar framework.
Typically, when fitting quantile regression models, one would instead use a loss
function corresponding to minimizing the expected loss of Y  u with respect to u,
according to
min
u
EŒ	 .Y  u/; (7.19)
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where 	 .y/ is given by
	 .y/ D y.
  1fy<0g/: (7.20)
Since the OpCar framework is only defined at the institutional level, this means
that, effectively, the modeling of the regression framework cannot easily incorporate
BEICFs such as KRI, KCI and KPI in a natural way. That is because these measures
are typically recorded at a more granular level than the institution level. Instead, new
OpRisk proxies and indicators were created under OpCar methods based on balance
sheet outputs.
In fact, twenty proxy indicators were developed from the BCBS 2010 QIS data bal-
ance sheets and income statements of the participating banks selected. These included
refinements related to GI, total assets, provisions, administrative costs and alterna-
tive types of factors. Unfortunately, the exact choice of twenty indicators used was
not explicitly stated in detail in the OpCar document Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision (2014, Annex 3); this makes it difficult to discuss the pros and cons
of the choices made. Nor was there a careful analysis undertaken of whether such
factors selected could have produced possible collinearity issues in the regression
design matrix. For instance, if you combine one covariate or factor with another fac-
tor derived from this one, or one strongly related to it (as seems to be suggested in the
cases with the GI-based factors), then the joint regression modeling with both factors
will lead to an increased variance in parameter estimation and misguided conclusions
about significance (statistical and practical) with regard to the factors selected in the
regression model.
8 PROPOSITION: A STANDARDIZATION OF THE ADVANCED
MEASUREMENT APPROACH
SMA cannot be considered as an alternative toAMA models.We suggest that theAMA
is not discarded but instead improved by addressing its current weaknesses. It should
be standardized! Details of how a rigorous and statistically robust standardization can
start to be considered, with practical considerations, are suggested below.
Rather than discarding all OpRisk modeling, as allowed under the AMA, the regu-
lator could instead make a proposal to standardize the approaches to modeling based
on the accumulated knowledge to date of OpRisk modeling practices. We propose
one class of models that can act in this manner and allow one to incorporate the key
features offered by AMA LDA-type models, which involve internal data, external
data, BEICFs and scenarios, with other important information on factors that the
SMA method and OpCar approaches have tried to achieve but failed. As has already
been noted, one issue with the SMA and OpCar approaches is that they try to model
all OpRisk processes at the institution or group level with a single LDA model and
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simplistic regression structure. This is bound to be problematic due to the very nature
and heterogeneity of OpRisk loss processes. In addition, it fails to allow for the incor-
poration of many important OpRisk loss process explanatory information sources,
such as BEICFs, which are often no longer informative or appropriate to incorporate
at the institution level compared with the individual BL/ET level.
A standardization of the AMA internal models will remove the wide range of
heterogeneity in model type. Here, our recommendation involves a bottom-up mod-
eling approach, where for each BL/ET OpRisk loss process we model the severity
and frequency components in an LDA structure. It can be comprised of a hybrid
LDA model with factor regression components; these allow us to include the factors
driving OpRisks in the financial industry at a sufficient level of granularity, while
also utilizing a class of models known as the generalized additive models for loca-
tion, shape and scale (GAMLSS) in the severity and frequency aspects of the LDA
framework. The class of GAMLSS models can be specified to make sure that the
severity and frequency families are comparable across institutions, allowing for both
risk-sensitivity and capital comparability. We recommend in this regard the Pois-
son and generalized Gamma classes for the family of frequency and severity mod-
els, as these capture all typical ranges of loss models used in practice over the last
fifteen years in OpRisk, including Gamma-, Weibull-, lognormal- and Pareto-type
severities.
Standardizing recommendation 1. This leads us to the first standardizing recommen-
dation relating to the level of granularity of modeling in OpRisk. The level of
granularity of the modeling procedure is important to consider when incorporating
different sources of OpRisk data, such as BEICFs and scenarios. This debate has
been going on for the last ten years, with much discussion on bottom-up- versus
top-down-based OpRisk modeling (see the overview in Cruz et al (2015) and Peters
and Shevchenko (2015)). We advocate that a bottom-up-based approach be recom-
mended as the standard modeling structure, as it will allow for greater understanding
and more appropriate model development of the actual loss processes under study.
Therefore, we argue that sticking with the fifty-six BL/ET structure of Basel II is
best for a standardizing framework, with a standard aggregation procedure to insti-
tution level/group level. We argue that alternatives such as the SMA and OpCar
approaches, which are trying to model multiple different featured loss processes
combined into one loss process at the institution level, are bound to fail, as they
need to capture high-frequency events as well as high-severity events. This, in
principle, is very difficult if not impossible to capture with a single LDA model at
the institution level, and it should be avoided. Further, such a bottom-up approach
allows for greater model interpretation and incorporation of OpRisk loss data, such
as BEICFs.
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Standardizing recommendation 2. This brings us to our second recommendation for
standardization in OpRisk modeling. Namely, we propose to standardize the mod-
eling class to remove the wide range of heterogeneity in model type. We propose
a standardization that involves a bottom-up modeling approach, where for each
BL/ET level of the OpRisk loss process we model the severity and frequency com-
ponents in an LDA structure that is comprised of a hybrid LDA model with factor
regression components. The way to achieve this is to utilize a class of GAMLSS
regression models for the severity and frequency model calibrations. That is, two
GAMLSS regression models are developed, one for the severity fitting and the
other for the frequency fitting. This family of models is flexible enough in our
opinion to capture any type of frequency or severity model that may be observed in
practice in OpRisk data, while incorporating factors such as BEICFs (KRIs, KPIs
and KCIs) naturally into the regression structure. This produces a class of hybrid
factor regression models in an OpRisk LDA family of models that can easily be
fit, simulated from and utilized in OpRisk modeling to aggregate to the institution
level. Further, as more years of data become available, the incorporation of time
series structure in the severity and frequency aspects of each loss process modeling
can be naturally incorporated into a GAMLSS regression LDA framework.
Standardizing recommendation 3. The class of models considered for the conditional
response in the GAMLSS severity model can be standardized. There are several
possible examples of such models that may be appropriate (Chavez-Demoulin et al
2015; Ganegoda and Evans 2013). However, we advocate for the severity models
that the class of models be restricted in regulation to one family, the generalized
Gamma family of models, where these models are developed in an LDA hybrid
factor GAMLSS model. Such models are appropriate for OpRisk, as they admit
special members that correspond to the lognormal, Pareto, Weibull and Gamma.All
of these models are popular OpRisk severity models used in practice and represent
the range of best practice by AMA banks, as observed in the recent survey by Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision (2009). Since the generalized Gamma family
contains all of these models as special sub-cases, this means that banks would only
have to ever fit one class of severity model to each BL/ET LDA severity profile.
Then, the most appropriate family member would be resolved in the fitting through
the estimation of the shape and scale parameters in such a manner that, if a lognor-
mal model was appropriate, it would be selected, whereas if a Gamma model were
more appropriate, it would also be selected from one single fitting procedure. Fur-
ther, the frequency model could be standardized as a Poisson GAMLSS regression
structure, as the addition of explanatory covariates, and time varying and possible
stochastic intensity allows for a flexible enough frequency model for all types of
OpRisk loss processes.
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Standardizing recommendation 4. The fitting of these models should be performed
in a regression-based manner in the GAMLSS framework, which incorporates
truncation and censoring in a penalized maximum likelihood framework (see
Stasinopoulos and Rigby 2007). We believe that by standardizing the fitting proce-
dure to one that is statistically rigorous, well understood in terms of the estimator
properties and robust when incorporating a censored likelihood appropriately, we
will remove the range of heuristic practices that has arisen in fitting models in
OpRisk. The penalized regression framework, based on the L1 parameter penalty,
will also allow for shrinkage methods to be used in order to select the most appro-
priate explanatory variables in the GAMLSS severity and frequency regression
structures.
Standardizing recommendation 5. The standardization in form of Bayesian- versus
Frequentist-type models should be left to the discretion of the bank, who can
decide which version is best for their practice. However, we note that, under a
Bayesian formulation, one can adequately incorporate multiple sources of infor-
mation, including expert opinion and scenario-based data (see discussions in Cruz
et al (2015), Peters et al (2009) and Shevchenko and Wüthrich (2006)).
Standardizing recommendation 6. The sets of BEICFs and factors to be incorporated
into each BL/ET LDA factor regression model for severity and frequency should be
specified by the regulator. There should be a core set of factors to be incorporated
by all banks that include BEICFs and other factors to be selected. The following
types of KRI categories can be considered in developing the core family of factors
(see Chapelle 2013).
 Exposure indicators: any significant change in the nature of the business
environment and its exposure to critical stakeholders or critical resources.
Flag any change in the risk exposure.
 Stress indicators: any significant rise in the use of resources by the business,
whether human or material. Flag any risk rising from overloaded humans or
machines.
 Causal indicators: metrics capturing the drivers of key risks to the business.
The core of preventive KRIs.
 Failure indicators: poor performance and failing controls are strong risk
drivers. Failed KPIs and KCIs.
In this approach, a key difference is that instead of fixing the regression coeffi-
cients for all banks (as is the case for SMA and OpCar), pretending that all banks
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have the same regression relationship as the entire banking population, one should
standardize the class of factors. Specify explicitly how they should be collected
as well as the frequency, and then specify that they should be incorporated in the
GAMLSS regression. This will allow each bank to then calibrate the regression
model to their loss experience through a rigorous penalized maximum likelihood
procedure, with strict criteria on cross-validation-based testing on the amount of
penalization admitted in the regression when shrinking factors out of the model.
This approach has the advantage that banks will not only start to better incorporate
the BEICF information into OpRisk models in a structured and statistically rigor-
ous manner, but they will also be forced to better collect and consider such factors
in a principled manner.
9 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we discussed and studied the weaknesses of the SMA formula for
OpRisk capital recently proposed by the Basel Committee to replace the AMA
and other current approaches. We also outlined the issues with the closely related
OpCar model, which is the precursor of the SMA. There are significant potential
problems with the use of the SMA, such as capital instability, risk insensitivity and
capital super-additivity as well as serious concerns regarding the estimation of this
model. We advocate standardization of the AMA rather than its complete removal,
and we provide several recommendations based on our experience with OpRisk
modeling.
DECLARATION OF INTEREST
The authors report no conflicts of interest. The authors alone are responsible for the
content and writing of the paper. Pavel Shevchenko acknowledges the support of the
Australian Research Council’s Discovery Projects funding scheme (project number:
DP160103489).
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
We would like to thank many OpRisk industry practitioners and academics in Aus-
tralia, Europe, the United Kingdom and the United States as well as the recent OpRisk
Europe 2016 conference in London, for useful discussions, and for sharing the views
and findings that have helped in the development and presentation of ideas within this
paper.
www.risk.net/journal Journal of Operational Risk
48 G. W. Peters et al
REFERENCES
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006). International convergence of capital
measurement and capital standards: a revised framework, comprehensive version.
Report, June, Bank for International Settlements.
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2009). Observed range of practice in key ele-
ments of Advanced Measurement Approaches (AMA). Report, July, Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements.
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2014). Operational risk: revisions to the simpler
approaches. Report, October, Bank for International Settlements.
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2016). Standardized measurement approach
for operational risk. Report, March, Bank for International Settlements.
Chapelle, A. (2013). The importance of preventive KRIs. Operational Risk and Regulation
58(April).
Chavez-Demoulin, V., Embrechts, P., and Hofert, M. (2015). An extreme value approach for
modeling operational risk losses depending on covariates.Journal of Risk and Insurance,
forthcoming (http://doi.org/bm2q).
Crockford, G.N. (1982).The bibliography and history of risk management:some preliminary
observations.Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance 7(23), 169–179 (http://doi.org/bppj).
Cruz, M., Peters, G., and Shevchenko, P.(2015). Fundamental Aspects of Operational Risk
and Insurance Analytics: A Handbook of Operational Risk. Wiley (http://doi.org/bppk).
Dong, A. X., Chan, J. S., and Peters, G. W. (2015). Risk margin quantile function via para-
metric and non-paramteric Bayesian approaches. Astin Bulletin 45(3), 503–550 (http://
doi.org/bppm).
Dutta, K., and Perry, J. (2006). A tale of tails: an empirical analysis of loss distribution
models for estimating operational risk capital. Working Paper 06-13, Federal Reserve
Bank of Boston (http://doi.org/fzcjcw).
Ganegoda, A., and Evans, J. (2013). A scaling model for severity of operational losses
using generalized additive models for location scale and shape (GAMLSS). Annals of
Actuarial Science 7(1), 61–100 (http://doi.org/bppn).
Guégan, D., and Hassani, B.(2013). Using a time series approach to correct serial corre-
lation in operational risk capital calculation.The Journal of Operational Risk 8(3), 31–56
(http://doi.org/bppq).
Peters, G., and Shevchenko, P. (2015). Advances in Heavy Tailed Risk Modeling: A
Handbook of Operational Risk. Wiley (http://doi.org/bppr).
Peters, G., Shevchenko, P. V., and Wüthrich, M. V. (2009). Dynamic operational risk:
modeling dependence and combining different sources of information. The Journal of
Operational Risk 4(2), 69–104 (http://doi.org/bprz).
Peters, G. W., Targino, R. S., and Shevchenko, P.V. (2013). Understanding operational risk
capital approximations: first and second orders. Journal of Governance and Regulation
2(3), 58–78.
Peters, G. W., Chen, W. Y., and Gerlach, R. H.(2016). Estimating quantile families of
loss distributions for non-life insurance modelling via L-moments. Risks 4(2) (http://
doi.org/bmqv).
Shevchenko, P. V. (2011). Modelling Operational Risk Using Bayesian Inference. Springer
(http://doi.org/bxsvwq).
Journal of Operational Risk www.risk.net/journal
Should AMA be replaced with SMA for operational risk 49
Shevchenko, P. V., and Wüthrich, M. V. (2006). The structural modelling of operational risk
via the Bayesian inference: combining loss data with expert opinions. The Journal of
Operational Risk 1(3), 3–26 (http://doi.org/bpqz).
Stasinopoulos, D. M., and Rigby, R. A. (2007). Generalized additive models for location
scale and shape (GAMLSS) in R. Journal of Statistical Software 23(7), 1–46 (http://
doi.org/bpps).
www.risk.net/journal Journal of Operational Risk

